Problem of Incoherence

[The Director]

Your stick that is longer than itself has an implied accident of the stick's length (itself), and a length longer than itself at the same time. Those two cancel each other out and leave you with nothing because they are mutually exclusive. Therefore, there is no conceptual substance to the object you are describing.

If we mix concepts together, we get a new concept right? Now why shouldn't that be true for something that would be impossible. The concepts may be contradictory and the overall product maybe contradictory but it is still a concept. We may not be able to describe it futher than the words we have attributed to it, but that is to expected as you are trying to define an impossible thing with possible descriptions. Just because we can't describe something doesn't mean it isn't a concept. Here's a mathematical example, 2+1=4, Yes that is impossible but it is still a concept that is made up of other concepts.

In language, you can put any phrase together that you want, and that phrase in of itself has meaning based upon the composition of words you are using. However, language itself is merely an accident used in description of the substance of something. The accident, in this case the phrase, may exist, but not the substance which it points to because it is an impossibility.

I'm not saying it exists as a substance, i'm saying it exists in the form of coded substance, such as thought and sound, as a concept.
Language is an accident, but it is an accident with existence in of itself, ergo any mixture of language exists because words and language exist.

Again, like I said earlier, the accidents may exist, but the substance doesn't. The phrase, the sound it makes when you say it, thinking of the words in your head, all of that doesn't make a stick that is longer than itself exist as a concept.

And, to bring it full circle, that's why it isn't a limit on omnipotence since the intrinsically impossible is incapable of production.

And as I said, i'm not saying it exists as a substance, but as coded substance. And I would argue that it does because all those things exist, if you mix existences shouldn't you get something that exists in itself?
Not to mention that is what a concept is at its basis, we later try to apply to substance and learn more about it. But we can't do that with concepts like the stick, because we can't apply it to substance. But just because we can't apply a conept to substance doesn't mean it isn't a concept, because we can still do things with it like have a debate over it.

And I don't see how if something is omnipotent why something impossible would be impossible, it would deny it its omnipotence. It would imply logic has more power than something that was omnipotent.

 

[Rennon]

We are just human our brains can't handle this sort of thing.

 

[Profesco]

Director, there is no such concept as a stick that is longer than itself. There is only the combination of words to describe the idea. But the idea is inconceivable. You cannot conceive of a stick that is longer than itself. It cannot exist, even in the realm of the mind.

Go ahead and conceive of a stick. Sans qualities, you're fine. Then give it the quality of length. This stick will only be as long as itself. Whatever the size of the stick, that's how long it is; not longer, not shorter. The size of the stick becomes an intrinsic quality of the stick, part of its definition. Therefore, it cannot be other than itself; it cannot be longer than itself. To call back to my earlier posts in this thread, A cannot be notA. Stick of A Length cannot be Stick of notA Length, neither in reality nor conceptuality.

In an attempt to tie the current discussion back to the thread's purpose, if we assign the quality of contradiction to the concept of omnipotence, then certainly it cannot logically exist either in reality or conceptuality. I suppose all it takes to answer the thread's question is merely to choose definitions of "omnipotence" and "possible" that cover such blindspots.

We are just human our brains can't handle this sort of thing.

Speak for yourself. This kind of talk is fun.

 

[Dragoon952]

In an attempt to tie the current discussion back to the thread's purpose, if we assign the quality of contradiction to the concept of omnipotence, then certainly it cannot logically exist either in reality or conceptuality. I suppose all it takes to answer the thread's question is merely to choose definitions of "omnipotence" and "possible" that cover such blindspots.

Indeed. I tried to bring up such definitions earlier but they might have gotten passed over. I presented the Catholic view of omnipotence, and I think it does well in describing it. The early church fathers debated this very subject for a long time, particularly Thomas Aquinas:

(Latin omnipotentia, from omnia and potens, able to do all things).

Omnipotence is the power of God to effect whatever is not intrinsically impossible. These last words of the definition do not imply any imperfection, since a power that extends to every possibility must be perfect. The universality of the object of the Divine power is not merely relative but absolute, so that the true nature of omnipotence is not clearly expressed by saying that God can do all things that are possible to Him; it requires the further statement that all things are possible to God. The intrinsically impossible is the self-contradictory, and its mutually exclusive elements could result only in nothingness. "Hence," says Thomas (Summa I, Q. xxv, a. 3), "it is more exact to say that the intrinsically impossible is incapable of production, than to say that God cannot produce it." To include the contradictory within the range of omnipotence, as does the Calvinist Vorstius, is to acknowledge the absurd as an object of the Divine intellect, and nothingness as an object of the Divine will and power. "God can do all things the accomplishment of which is a manifestation of power," says Hugh of St. Victor, "and He is almighty because He cannot be powerless" (De sacram., I, ii, 22).

As intrinsically impossible must be classed:

1.Any action on the part of God which would be out of harmony with His nature and attributes;
2.Any action that would simultaneously connote mutually repellent elements, e.g. a square circle, an infinite creature, etc.

 

[The Director]

Director, there is no such concept as a stick that is longer than itself. There is only the combination of words to describe the idea. But the idea is inconceivable. You cannot conceive of a stick that is longer than itself. It cannot exist, even in the realm of the mind.

What are we arguing about if it doesn't exist in some form?

How can we argue or even think about something that doesn't exist?
We can do it for things that aren't real, but not for existence.

And concepts are merely many different descriptions of the same thing. Just because a concept has a limited amount of descriptions doesn't mean it isn't any less of a concept.

Go ahead and conceive of a stick. Sans qualities, you're fine. Then give it the quality of length. This stick will only be as long as itself. Whatever the size of the stick, that's how long it is; not longer, not shorter. The size of the stick becomes an intrinsic quality of the stick, part of its definition. Therefore, it cannot be other than itself; it cannot be longer than itself. To call back to my earlier posts in this thread, A cannot be notA. Stick of A Length cannot be Stick of notA Length, neither in reality nor conceptuality.

But you conceived that argument to argue against me, and as such you have proved it can be done. You understand the concept so you can argue with it.

Basically, what this has come down to is.

"Everything we can conceive exists."
"No, because *insert example*."
"You just transferred that example to me. Are you saying that example doesn't exist as a concept and as such you have transferred nothing to me even though I am reacting to it?"

Here's an equation for the length of a stick that is longer than itself. L= x where x is undefined. As it is undefined it is always longer, shorter and the same length of the stick at the same time.

Or to put in your example, A can equal notA if A means nothing/ is undefined.

In an attempt to tie the current discussion back to the thread's purpose, if we assign the quality of contradiction to the concept of omnipotence, then certainly it cannot logically exist either in reality or conceptuality. I suppose all it takes to answer the thread's question is merely to choose definitions of "omnipotence" and "possible" that cover such blindspots.

If one can assign contradictions to omnipotence in practice, as we seemingly can, then it just means it cannot be real. But we still consider it as a concept because a concept doesn't necessarily have any of the qualities the concept describes. But if we mix the concept of omnipotence and contradiction, we get something new, but omnipotence as a concept isn't destroyed.

Speak for yourself. This kind of talk is fun.

Seconded.

 

[TheFightingPikachu]

What Do You Say?

You know, I believe I forgot something regarding GhostAnime's previous response. I shouldn't have rushed.

Furthermore, the Logical Problem of Evil wouldn't necessarily disprove the existence of a god; to me, it just gives me a reason not to worship him at the very least.

Except that the very formulation "Logical Problem of Evil" is about logic. The person named Mackie (quoted multiple times in that article) said that this problem means the orthodox belief in God "is positively irrational." When you say the problem of evil is such that God might exist but be unworthy of worship, you're unconsciously tending toward the Evidential Problem of Evil.

I'll explain more about this after I talk to SunnyC about The Golden Compass.

Yeah, you've somewhat misunderstood me. I'm saying I believe the mortal world is cruel and illogical and incoherent. Either it's part of God's benevolence to make tragedies happen, or the devil, the epitome of someone crippled and controlled by their own unbridled free will, whom he purposefully lets onto people and does not stop from making tragedies happen. Six to one, half dozen to the other. One would say, the Garden of Eden, genesis, is where the serpent offered Eve the apple and she took it. God was not responsible for giving man free will -

- He warned them and deliberately chose not to surveil them (Just because he has omniscience doesn't mean he has to exhibit it all the time, and to be unable to not exhibit it would indicate a lack of control over the ability.)
- He decided the snake should be in the garden, who somehow already had free will.
- Afterwards he was angry at Adam and Eve for disobeying them, and you could argue that he made the deliberate decision to leave them with the free will so they could learn about it.

Sometimes I view that as incoherent. We percieve a blurry line between God's own free will, and what may seem to be God's inability to stop suffering. And if it is his will for mortals to suffer, people may point out a flaw in his omnibenevolance. Even though God must have free will over his omnibenevolance, in order to be omnipotent; and his omnibenevolence may extend to a point in which we cannot logically observe to a conclusion in which he is ultimately benevolent to all of us.

I would point out that the tree was never said to give free will; it was the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. Since that event, we know have a conscience, a now-essential weapon in the fight against evil.

I don't think that can be viewed as any more incoherent than "free will versus predestination," which is one of the topics I specifically attempt to avoid. (Hint: both are true. Watch as I take massive fire for that answer.)

There are many people unhappy with this arrangement and cite modern politics and ethics saying that men cannot punish other men like this and still be considered good. Those are considered cult leaders. Or codependent relationships. This is one reason *some* athiests explain for their problem with God even existing. In a more extreme fashion, some people who leave their dogma half-open state that if a God does exist we ought to hold him for war crimes. Some people hold the original sin as a symbol of enlightenment and liberty - and I am only willing to talk that much about the spectrum into what I referred to as the left hand path. The rest of it disturbs me greatly. I've read Phillip Pullman's His Dark Materials, (Or the dumbed down title, The Golden Compass) which is for young adults. This series typecasts sin as a sexual energy in the form of "dust" and corruption and magnamity as a greater problem. It revolves around the second coming of Eve, as a girl named Lyra who lies and tricks people to eventually kill "The Authority", who is portrayed as a self-aggrandizing God who lies that he created the universe at all.

Everyone is entitled to their opinions, and their feelings. For me, I believe that for faith involves perserverence through pain, suffering, confusion, embitterment, and ultimately obstinance through the incoherence of being alive, and faith that something lies in a value percieved beyond life. Therefore, I'm not worried about the incoherence. What I was trying to say really was that some people really do see God as incoherent, and they are worried about it, and that's why athiests and left-side pathers exist.

You know, that's not the first time I've heard of Phillip Pullman and The Golden Compass. So, on a personal note, I'd like to take a moment to tell that story.

I had heard of the movie just by title when I saw ads for it in Nintendo Power. I suspected something might be off when I noticed one of the characters was a "daemon" (which is just a fancy spelling for "demon") named "Pan" (since I'd heard some things indicating that Pan is in some circles a symbol of Satan).

So one of my friends from church; a serious, Bible-believing conservative (who BTW believes Pokémon is demonic/borderline demonic), said he was reading that book because of the movie. He explains some of the plot details and such.

He comes to church one day and asks me "How is this word pronounced?" then proceeds to write "D-A-E-M-O-N." I look up at him, down at the paper again, and back at him and say "Demon."

In all subsequent discussions of the book, whenever he referred to Pan (and any others daemons in the book)...I'm kinda forgetting what he would say. I think he used the phrase "animal." So he'd say, "Pan is different from other of the 'animals' because he can transform." And, "This bad guy has an 'animal' too, and he's really strong" (or something like that).

Within the week (if I remember correctly), mom heard on the phone from one of her church friends (who heard from the pastor's once-literature-teaching wife) how "the author of the book that new Golden Compass movie is based on is one really scary guy. He says we should kill off God!"

By the end of that week, my friend had gotten to the end of whichever book mentions the whole "lying god" thing. (Is that just the first book? I thought he got through at least several.) He also talked to the pastor's wife and heard about the author's strange views. Next week he comes to church with the strangest look on his face, seemingly the residual horror of having read such blatantly anti-Christian stuff without at first realizing it was an attack on his faith. He told me all the same stuff I'd heard passed on from Mom. When I mentioned I had heard it, he said..."Why didn't you tell me?" I told him, "I knew only a very short time before you did." Of course, because of past expaerience with him, I really wanted to say, "And because I didn't think you'd listen to me," but I didn't say that.

(Okay, so it took more than a moment to tell that story.)
----------------------

Anyway, to both SunnyC and GhostAnime: The idea that God might not be all three of the aforementioned "Omni" attributes does not necessarily mean that God is unworthy of worship. After all, pagans everywhere worshiped lots of gods who weren't "Omni"-anything! To say that God must be omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent or else he must impotent, ignorant, and malevolent is a false dichotomy.

The best example would be a hypothetical omnibenevolent god who is powerful enough to create at least one universe (without being omnipotent), and extremely knowledgeable (without being omniscient). Since such a god is wholly good, there is no moral reason why you shouldn't follow him if indeed he exists.


GhostAnime: I want to let you know that I did look at the tenth sectio of the IEP article. As a matter of fact, I examined it shortly after you provided the link. And I quite frankly admit I don't have any kind of in-depth answer to the questions posed there. I have a few vague ideas, and would gladly get back to that (please press me on that, and I'll give it a shot), but I want to post quickly so I don't lose a particularly good opportunity....

Hey, I decide my quality, brother! Anyway, as I remember our dialogue about infinity, I was describing concepts while you were describing mathematical figures, so I saw no need to reply further. As for being offended, mine's realer. Nya!

Precisely. You do determine the quality of your posts. Mention "1/2 infinity" (not even real as a concept) one more time and I'll drop an Encyclopedia Britanica on ya!

That is good, FightingPikachu. I appreciate such intent. My participation in this discussion has been peripheral and maintenance-like, rather than directed at the larger central theme, so please continue, with my respect and encouragement. ^_^

You are welcome! Things are about to get interesting:

All words have different interpretations meanings, it's one of the reasons translations of things (especially eastern texts) are done several times, it is nearly always dependent upon the hearer.

Wait just a minute! Can you back up the assertion that "translations of things (especially eastern texts) are done several times"? I've never heard that one before. What about international business?

Some may say the dual nature of light (how it works as a particle sometimes, and a wave as others) is contradictory that still exists.

Ah, now we get to a core issue. It doesn't matter what some say. Some say that higher mathematics doesn't make sense. They're mistaken. What do you say about the wave-particle duality?

 

[GhostAnime]

Anyway, to both SunnyC and GhostAnime: The idea that God might not be all three of the aforementioned "Omni" attributes does not necessarily mean that God is unworthy of worship. After all, pagans everywhere worshiped lots of gods who weren't "Omni"-anything! To say that God must be omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent or else he must impotent, ignorant, and malevolent is a false dichotomy.

The best example would be a hypothetical omnibenevolent god who is powerful enough to create at least one universe (without being omnipotent), and extremely knowledgeable (without being omniscient). Since such a god is wholly good, there is no moral reason why you shouldn't follow him if indeed he exists.

So, you argue this being is still worthy of worship? Let's look at a few scenarios if he were to exist.

Disclaimer: These are only my feelings.

Scenario 1: God can do anything (or anything logically possible), but does not stop evil in the world.

Scenario 2: God isn't able to stop evil in the world.

In scenario one, you would probably argue that he won't stop evil because it's "free will"; however, I find that argument only applies to the already rich Western World. What about poor countries that are a result of decisions made in the past? If someone wants to argue that free will justifies no action from God, then I want to know how it is morally right for a child to be born in permanent poverty because his great, great ancestors were damaged by others due to greed and arrogance. Not everything in the world is even a result of free will.

Another argument you might make for scenario one is that evil is necessary. This makes a lot more logical sense to me (especially if this being doesn't have an afterlife), but this still doesn't make me want to worship him. So, what would we be then? Entertainment? Bleh.

Scenario two is pretty self-explanatory and you probably won't bother with that part much.

Anyone is free to list any other possible scenarios.

 

[Profesco]

What are we arguing about if it doesn't exist in some form?

How can we argue or even think about something that doesn't exist?
We can do it for things that aren't real, but not for existence.

And concepts are merely many different descriptions of the same thing. Just because a concept has a limited amount of descriptions doesn't mean it isn't any less of a concept.

But you conceived that argument to argue against me, and as such you have proved it can be done. You understand the concept so you can argue with it.

Ah, I see where we are having trouble. There is a difference between "exists," "can be conceived of," and "able to be described by words." Those three properties can overlap, but the latter ones do not guarantee the former ones. Words convey meaning, not existence.

Basically, what this has come down to is.

"Everything we can conceive exists."
"No, because *insert example*."
"You just transferred that example to me. Are you saying that example doesn't exist as a concept and as such you have transferred nothing to me even though I am reacting to it?"

We've simply denied your first premise, namely that everything itself can be conceived. Contradictions can be described, not conceived. It's what "contradiction" means.

Here's an equation for the length of a stick that is longer than itself. L= x where x is undefined. As it is undefined it is always longer, shorter and the same length of the stick at the same time.

Or to put in your example, A can equal notA if A means nothing/ is undefined.

Your mistake is a simple one. In order to claim notA, A must be defined. If A is undefined, then notA is undefined, which means it cannot be defined as A ... or not... A. (Wow @_@)

And furthermore, in the stick example, "x" is defined. It is the length of the stick. Since "x" is defined as "length of the stick," "notx" would necessarily be defined as "not the length of the stick," and so your assertion that they are the same thing fails. Whatever length that stick is, it is precisely that length. That is the definition.

Precisely. You do determine the quality of your posts. Mention "1/2 infinity" (not even real as a concept) one more time and I'll drop an Encyclopedia Britanica on ya!

Alright, you've prompted me to look back at our discussion.

Let's say I have an infinite number of marbles (conveniently labeled). This is abstract, so don't worry, I fully understand that people can't really have an infinite number of marbles. Now, for this example to explain about subtracting infinity from infinity, I can't just subtract one marble or even a bazillion marbles from my collection; I must subtract an infinite number. So, what if I wanted to give an infinite number to you? There are several ways I could do this. First, I could give you all the marbles labeled with an odd number. Since there are infinitely many of each (odd and even numbers), the quantities kept and given away are both infinite. This means that infinity minus infinity is infinity here. On the other hand, I could give you all of them. I wouldn't have any left, which would mean infinity minus infinity is zero here. But if I happen to like my first twenty marbles, I could give you all the marbles marked twenty-one and higher. I would still have twenty, so infinity minus infinity would equal twenty.

In each of these examples, I started with infinitely many marbles and gave away infinitely many marbles, but I got different results each time. The result can be zero, or any natural number, or even infinity. This is why infinity minus infinity is undefined.

1) infinity - (1/2)infinity = infinity.
[If you do the work, you'll notice that the first step of the problem is to halve your second infinity, which happens to still be called infinity. In this problem, the infinity you began with represents "the total amount of marbles" while the second infinity is defined as "half of the total amount of marbles," so they are two different figures.]

2) infinity - infinity = 0.
[Here, both infinities are the exact same figure; namely, "the total amount of marbles." Thus the answer is rightly 0.]

3) infinity - (infinity - 20) = 20.
[Here, the second infinity once again represents a different figure: "the total amount of marbles minus twenty marbles." If you do the work, which involves distributing the negative, you'll see that the problem becomes 'infinity - infinity + 20,' where the infinities cancel out, making the answer rightly 20.]

We were both using abstract thoughts, and we both came to the same conclusions in the problems you presented. Certainly, speaking of something like "1/2 infinity" is not a conceivable concept, much like "infinity" itself is not a conceivable concept - they are merely describable, and I illustrated the differences in descriptions used in each problem. The very same differences you described in order to achieve your different answers! I said nothing that contradicted your work or results, I simply stressed that "having different definitions" is not necessarily interchangeable with "undefined."

May I ask what made my post of such dubious quality?

I only came in to clarify the meanings behind the math, so I'm not aware of the exact context in which you had been speaking, but I imagine the only difference between your post and mine was that the point I stressed made some portion of your argument in some way less finally definitive.

Edit:

because of past expaerience with him

Also, if that was an intentional dig at the pretentious use of "daemon," I want to let you know it was clever and gave me a good chuckle, kudos. X3

 

[CSolarstorm]

His Dark Materials wails on Christianity in a pretty blatant way, yes, particularly the Catholic Church. Here's a passage from my "nutjob" book as BigLutz affectionately calls it, in an article that explores the good origins of Christian syntax for evil.

The word "demon" has some noble ancestors as well. In Greek, the daemon was the divine force that engendered and informed the character of man. In Latin, this concept was adopted and called genius. Daemon was well-known enough as a term describing an internal creative spirit, or a set of natural skills and inclinations, to make into Shakespeare, as per this discussion between an Egyptian seer and Antony...

And that is exactly how Pullman portrays daemons in His Dark Materials. He portrays them as manifestations of creative and sexual energy. His series is divided in three novels, the first of which, in Britain is The Golden Compasses, which refer to the kind of compasses the "His" would use to draw a circle and build something with. This is kind of a neon arrow pointing to the Great Architect of Freemasonry.

Basically, after studying some Freud and other schools of thought in college, I observe that what Pullman does (I read the whole series as an informed adult) is write with characters identifying with modern schools of thought, give them Greco-Roman and pre-Christian names and goals, then set out to attack Catholicism, pretty much.

I actually applaud Pullman for his frank sincerity though. In my mind, daemons were the most honest interpretations of what has been a trend in the media for a while, starting with Digimon, and going to Yu-Gi-Oh and Pokemon; having monster partner(s) and using them as an expression of yourself, in other words, getting daemons. Yu-Gi-Oh is the the most obvious example, and Pokemon I believe is the McDonalds of daemon-collecting, the best marketed, the most "dolled up", hardest to make a credible argument against as a Christian. I could do it though, and have done it, for the fun of it.

But I'm quite liberal about what I watch and read anyway, and do not mind something with an alternative discipline to mine; as long as I know that it is alternative. But since I veered off topic:

@GhostAnime - I would argue that God doesn't stop suffering, because he doesn't want to; it's his perrogative, and I think that he can still be called omnibenevolant while following that perrogative, if in the long run that suffering gives you knowledge that satiates faith and you find yourself better endowed in the afterlife. And I mean, the afterlife is a big part of the equation here. Isn't there eternal heaven for the faithful? What is even extreme pain and poverty and suffering when compared to an afterward of eternal benevolance?

And that one life is still some suffering, but if it is to teach a lesson, to find a certain thing for yourself that you need to be happy forever, than it is enshrined within an act of benevolence; hence why I've claimed before that anything God does can be interpreted as benevolant regardless of whether we feel suffering from it.

 

[AzukanAsimbu]

This topic ended up about sticks?

 

[Dragoon952]

This topic ended up about sticks?

If you were looking for a coherent argument, you are in the wrong thread.

On a side note, Pullman also stated his hatred for C.S. Lewis and the Chronicles of Narnia and wanted to write an antithesis to it. But that's neither here nor there I suppose.

 

[Tim the turtle]

And I mean, the afterlife is a big part of the equation here. Isn't there eternal heaven for the faithful? What is even extreme pain and poverty and suffering when compared to an afterward of eternal benevolance?

This is same divine benefactor who deliberately and with (what seems to me like) malice of forethought decides to punish individuals who choose to exercise their free will, the free will that is supposedly God's "get out of jail free card" for suffering. So essentially we have God, who presents himself as a wise, caring, loving, fatherly, benevolent being (though frankly the God presented in most Holy Books clearly demonstrates he is none of those things) damning people to eternal suffering for exercising the very free will that he gave them. And he has the gall to command people to respect him, nay, to love him. To be utterly afraid of him and deferent and adoring at the same time. What hypocrisy.

So I don't believe for one moment that the Biblical God has any sort of problem of contradictions between benevolence and evil, because the Biblical God strikes me as the most abhorent of dictators one could possibly imagine, fully in keeping with all the suffering in the world.

 

[CSolarstorm]

This is same divine benefactor who deliberately and with (what seems to me like) malice of forethought decides to punish individuals who choose to exercise their free will, the free will that is supposedly God's "get out of jail free card" for suffering.

That's a good point.

 

[Dragoon952]

This is same divine benefactor who deliberately and with (what seems to me like) malice of forethought decides to punish individuals who choose to exercise their free will, the free will that is supposedly God's "get out of jail free card" for suffering. So essentially we have God, who presents himself as a wise, caring, loving, fatherly, benevolent being (though frankly the God presented in most Holy Books clearly demonstrates he is none of those things) damning people to eternal suffering for exercising the very free will that he gave them. And he has the gall to command people to respect him, nay, to love him. To be utterly afraid of him and deferent and adoring at the same time. What hypocrisy.

So I don't believe for one moment that the Biblical God has any sort of problem of contradictions between benevolence and evil, because the Biblical God strikes me as the most abhorent of dictators one could possibly imagine, fully in keeping with all the suffering in the world.

Even though that is kind of off subject, it completely depends on how you look at it and how you define "evil."

It goes back to a notion of, as Profesco alluded to, notA indirectly existing upon the creation of A. If God intended to create "good" for all intents and purposes, for human beings to have a full understanding of "good" it would be necessary for us to understand the indirect creation of "not good." Otherwise good would be meaningless in nature. Such is the nature of being given a form of free will, which would not be free at all if the only outcomes afforded to it were "good" in nature.

As Augustine stated, "God judged it better to bring good out of evil than to suffer no evil to exist." It's hard to wrap your head around (much like the topic of omnipotence) but it stands to reason that if God wanted to create something that would strive for a fuller understanding of him as a creator, it is necessary for evil to exist for us to fully grasp and appreciate the good. And, if God is fully good, then we would never be able to fully understand or appreciate him without a greater knowledge of what good isn't.

So, who has the better fullness of action: the person who HAS to do something, or the person that WANTS to do something?

 

[GhostAnime]

@GhostAnime - I would argue that God doesn't stop suffering, because he doesn't want to; it's his perrogative, and I think that he can still be called omnibenevolant while following that perrogative, if in the long run that suffering gives you knowledge that satiates faith and you find yourself better endowed in the afterlife. And I mean, the afterlife is a big part of the equation here. Isn't there eternal heaven for the faithful? What is even extreme pain and poverty and suffering when compared to an afterward of eternal benevolance?

So basically, we suffer so we can enjoy the afterlife better? What do you even imagine the afterlife to be? Think of a place where there's no suffering, challenges, or goals for eternity and the only thing you do is praise God. Do you have to eat anymore? Watch sports? Play video games? Use technology? What is there to truly do for an eternity?

But that's another subject entirely.. but simply because he has "something in store" doesn't justify the worst acts you hear about in history. Again, there are so many better ways he could have gone about doing this, and I find it hard that a "compassionate" God thinks the current setup is the best possible way to teach evil or make the afterlife appealing.

Most of your post was answered in my first reply, I think.

Edit: Wow, I just screwed everything up.

@Dragoon: I went over that scenario in my earlier post that arguing "Evil is necessary" is the only logical reason, but isn't a compassionate reason. I don't think this is the only scenario he could have tried to do this.

Why couldn't he just endow us with this knowledge? Do you think that's somehow impossible (especially considering that's what he tried to do in the first place) If there's an afterlife, why couldn't we just watch from afar as opposed to being involved in it? What about people that die but NEVER see evil in their entire lives?

It's impossible to tell good from bad without bad, but things like natural disasters aren't necessarily "evil" but "natural".

Either he's being entertained (honestly the only other reason I'd think someone would rather us be involved in it rather than giving us the ability), or he did not choose the most compassionate decision.

 

[Dragoon952]

So basically, we suffer so we can enjoy the afterlife better? What do you even imagine the afterlife to be? Think of a place where there's no suffering, challenges, or goals for eternity and the only thing you do is praise God. Do you have to eat anymore? Watch sports? Play video games? Use technology? What is there to truly do for an eternity?

But that's another subject entirely.. but simply because he has "something in store" doesn't justify the worst acts you hear about in history. Again, there are so many better ways he could have gone about doing this, and I find it hard that a "compassionate" God thinks the current setup is the best possible way to teach evil or make the afterlife appealing.

Most of your post was answered in my first reply, I think.

Edit: Wow, I just screwed everything up.

@Dragoon: I went over that scenario in my earlier post that arguing "Evil is necessary" is the only logical reason, but isn't a compassionate reason. I don't think this is the only scenario he could have tried to do this.

Why couldn't he just endow us with this knowledge? Do you think that's somehow impossible (especially considering that's what he tried to do in the first place) If there's an afterlife, why couldn't we just watch from afar as opposed to being involved in it? What about people that die but NEVER see evil in their entire lives?

It's impossible to tell good from bad without bad, but things like natural disasters aren't necessarily "evil" but "natural".

Either he's being entertained (honestly the only other reason I'd think someone would rather us be involved in it rather than giving us the ability), or he did not choose the most compassionate decision.

Again, we can't possibly conceive of what it would be like to exist in such sceanrios you describe, but I would still argue that it would lack "perfection" without having direct involvement.

A good analogy to what I'm saying is present in the movie series The Matrix. Who are better off? The people that are blissfully ignorant and have, essentially, everything provided to them on a silver platter, or the people who have broken free and therefore know of the bondage they were in previously?

Again, I am speaking from a Catholic understanding, but these very topics have been discussed at great length. Here is a good explanation from Thomas Aquinas, although again you have to wrap your head around it:

Evil is threefold, viz., "malum naturæ" (metaphysical evil), "culpæ" (moral), and "paenæ" (physical, the retributive consequence of "malum culpæ") (I, Q. xlviii, a. 5, 6; Q. lxiii, a. 9; De Malo, I, 4). Its existence subserves the perfection of the whole; the universe would be less perfect if it contained no evil. Thus fire could not exist without the corruption of what it consumes; the lion must slay the *** in order to live, and if there were no wrong doing, there would be no sphere for patience and justice (I, Q. xlviii, a. 2). God is said (as in Isaiah 45) to be the author of evil in the sense that the corruption of material objects in nature is ordained by Him, as a means for carrying out the design of the universe; and on the other hand, the evil which exists as a consequence of the breach of Divine laws is in the same sense due to Divine appointment; the universe would be less perfect if its laws could be broken with impunity. Thus evil, in one aspect, i.e. as counter-balancing the deordination of sin, has the nature of good (II, Q. ii, a. 19). But the evil of sin (culpæ), though permitted by God, is in no sense due to him (I, Q. xlix, a. 2).; its cause is the abuse of free will by angels and men (I-II, Q. lxxiii, a. 6; II-II, Q. x, a. 2; I-II, Q. ix, a. 3). It should be observed that the universal perfection to which evil in some form is necessary, is the perfection of this universe, not of any universe: metaphysical evil, that is to say, and indirectly, moral evil as well, is included in the design of the universe which is partially known to us; but we cannot say without denying the Divine omnipotence, that another equally perfect universe could not be created in which evil would have no place.

Compassionate doesn't always = no pain. The parent disciplines the child not out of perverse pleasure, but for the good of the child. That is compassion for the well-being of the child, even though it brings about the discomfort of the child.

Such is the nature of punishment. If you were "threatened" with consequences, but knew there was no possible way that consequence would happen, it would render your decisions meaningless because of only one outcome present. For a perfection of volition to be present, it is necessary for all possible consequences to exist.

EDIT: Wow, blanked out the word for donkey. In case you were wondering what nasty thing Thomas Aquinas was referring to

 

[Tim the turtle]

Even though that is kind of off subject, it completely depends on how you look at it and how you define "evil."

It goes back to a notion of, as Profesco alluded to, notA indirectly existing upon the creation of A. If God intended to create "good" for all intents and purposes, for human beings to have a full understanding of "good" it would be necessary for us to understand the indirect creation of "not good." Otherwise good would be meaningless in nature. Such is the nature of being given a form of free will, which would not be free at all if the only outcomes afforded to it were "good" in nature.

As Augustine stated, "God judged it better to bring good out of evil than to suffer no evil to exist." It's hard to wrap your head around (much like the topic of omnipotence) but it stands to reason that if God wanted to create something that would strive for a fuller understanding of him as a creator, it is necessary for evil to exist for us to fully grasp and appreciate the good. And, if God is fully good, then we would never be able to fully understand or appreciate him without a greater knowledge of what good isn't.

So, who has the better fullness of action: the person who HAS to do something, or the person that WANTS to do something?

Absolutely nothing of what you have just said has any bearing on the topic of hell. It's perfectly easy to have good and evil without heaven and hell. The afterlife is not in any sense necessary to the application of morals. I agree that evil must exist for good to exist, and that it's a nice way to explain the cruelties of the cosmos. But there has to be a limit. You can't posit a "loving" creator (as Christianity and in fact most religions do) who knowingly, willing and with some relish subjects people he supposedly loves to eternal suffering and pain! That is not moral. That is not good. That is the sickest, most vile concept in the entirety of human history. A person may lead a perfectly good life, be full of love for her friends and family, be the kindest most gentle mother and the most devoted of givers who yet suffers horrendous hardships in life and who suffers through them, thinking only of others... and if she does not love God -a God who demands fealty yet makes his presence unimaginably scarce except for one supposed period of history in one of the most remote areas of Palestine- then she is to be punished, for eternity! You cannot possibly tell me that any part of that is moral. Simply saying that it must be because God is good is begging the question and you know it.

Not to mention the obvious fallacy of your final statement. What is the threat of hell if the not the most terrible of coersions? What is heaven if not the sweetest (sickly so I might add) of incentives? People would be truly free if the concepts of heaven and hell did not exist, and were not preached by just about church of every religion or denomination. Then, and only then, would people really do things because they wanted to do them for the sake of the actions themselves.

 

[Dragoon952]

Absolutely nothing of what you have just said has any bearing on the topic of hell. It's perfectly easy to have good and evil without heaven and hell. The afterlife is not in any sense necessary to the application of morals. I agree that evil must exist for good to exist, and that it's a nice way to explain the cruelties of the cosmos. But there has to be a limit. You can't posit a "loving" creator (as Christianity and in fact most religions do) who knowingly, willing and with some relish subjects people he supposedly loves to eternal suffering and pain! That is not moral. That is not good. That is the sickest, most vile concept in the entirety of human history. A person may lead a perfectly good life, be full of love for her friends and family, be the kindest most gentle mother and the most devoted of givers who yet suffers horrendous hardships in life and who suffers through them, thinking only of others... and if she does not love God -a God who demands fealty yet makes his presence unimaginably scarce except for one supposed period of history in one of the most remote areas of Palestine- then she is to be punished, for eternity! You cannot possibly tell me that any part of that is moral. Simply saying that it must be because God is good is begging the question and you know it.

Not to mention the obvious fallacy of your final statement. What is the threat of hell if the not the most terrible of coersions? What is heaven if not the sweetest (sickly so I might add) of incentives? People would be truly free if the concepts of heaven and hell did not exist, and were not preached by just about church of every religion or denomination. Then, and only then, would people really do things because they wanted to do them for the sake of the actions themselves.

This would really bunny trail off into a discussion about the differences between Protestant and Catholic theology (note: just saying "Christian" in terms of these discussions is not accurate in any way) and stray from the path of the problem of incoherence. The possibility of the existence of a God is a separate argument from the nature of said God.

In any event, in a VERY boiled down quick overview, Catholics do not believe that every human being on the face of the planet has the chance to effectively hear the gospel. You are then going to dive into the concept of Baptism of Desire (i.e., would have accepted the tennants of Christ if they were given the ample opportunity to do so), and that can be a whole debate in of itself entirely.

Also, Catholics differentiate between mortal and venial sin. Hell is the punishment for those that die in mortal sin, which has conditions for existence:

Contrary to the teaching of Baius (prop. 46, Denzinger-Bannwart, 1046) and the Reformers, a sin must be a voluntary act. Those actions alone are properly called human or moral actions which proceed from the human will deliberately acting with knowledge of the end for which it acts. Man differs from all irrational creatures in this precisely that he is master of his actions by virtue of his reason and free will (I-II:1:1). Since sin is a human act wanting in due rectitude, it must have, in so far as it is a human act, the essential constituents of a human act. The intellect must perceive and judge of the morality of the act, and the will must freely elect. For a deliberate mortal sin there must be full advertence on the part of the intellect and full consent on the part of the will in a grave matter. An involuntary transgression of the law even in a grave matter is not a formal but a material sin. The gravity of the matter is judged from the teaching of Scripture, the definitions of councils and popes, and also from reason. Those sins are judged to be mortal which contain in themselves some grave disorder in regard to God, our neighbour, ourselves, or society. Some sins admit of no lightness of matter, as for example, blasphemy, hatred of God; they are always mortal (ex toto genere suo), unless rendered venial by want of full advertence on the part of the intellect or full consent on the part of the will. Other sins admit lightness of matter: they are grave sins (ex genere suo) in as much as their matter in itself is sufficient to constitute a grave sin without the addition of any other matter, but is of such a nature that in a given case, owing to its smallness, the sin may be venial, e.g. theft.

Again, this is all bunny-trailing, but it differentiates with the views of Luther and Calvin who "taught as their fundamental error that no free will properly so called remained in man after the fall of our first parents; that the fulfillment of God's precepts is impossible even with the assistance of grace, and that man in all his actions sins."

There is no fallacy in my final statement. The existence of "punishment and reward" are completely necessary for the freedom of our will. Action without consequence could in no way be voluntary in nature, which is what makes us human. (Edit: and again, another conversation can be had about what bearing knowledge of punishment and reward has upon action).

Again, I can think of no greater example than punishment dealt to children. If you tell them they will be grounded for doing a certain act, and they do it anyway, that is of their own volition knowing of the consequences should it be discovered that they completed said act. The punishment didn't deter the action, but the follow through is necessary to have complete and full udnerstanding of the action. And the action was completed with full knowledge of the consequences.

Look around you. Who doesn't know of concepts of eternal punishment/salvation? And does that truly affect the voluntary nature of our action? This conversation is proof to the contrary.

In any event, I think "hell" is looked at the wrong way. It isn't a threat to force us to go a certain way. It is just the punishment for mortal sin. It's hard to explain, but there is a difference between "You will be punished for doing A" and "I will punish you for doing A." The former relies on your action being the basis of the punishment, the latter is based upon my act as the delivery system of punishment. Such is the nature of the punishment of hell, being that it through our free will and volition and based upon our voluntary actions, rather than being some notion of being damned by God (which would insinuate we do not have a part in the matter and our damnation is dependent upon the action of God and not of ourselves).

 

[Tim the turtle]

This would really bunny trail off into a discussion about the differences between Protestant and Catholic theology (note: just saying "Christian" in terms of these discussions is not accurate in any way) and stray from the path of the problem of incoherence. The possibility of the existence of a God is a separate argument from the nature of said God.

In any event, in a VERY boiled down quick overview, Catholics do not believe that every human being on the face of the planet has the chance to effectively hear the gospel. You are then going to dive into the concept of Baptism of Desire (i.e., would have accepted the tennants of Christ if they were given the ample opportunity to do so), and that can be a whole debate in of itself entirely.

Also, Catholics differentiate between mortal and venial sin. Hell is the punishment for those that die in mortal sin, which has conditions for existence:

Even with that, I utterly fail to see how any crime or "sin" commitable on Earth, no matter how horrible or despicable, warrants eternal suffering and torment.

There is no fallacy in my final statement. The existence of "punishment and reward" are completely necessary for the freedom of our will. Action without consequence could in no way be voluntary in nature, which is what makes us human. (Edit: and again, another conversation can be had about what bearing knowledge of punishment and reward has upon action).

No action is totally free of consequences. We don't live in a vacuum. However there comes a point when actions cannot be considered a proper, moral choice precicely because of the given (often engineered) consequences. We would not dare say that a man making decisions at gun-point is exercising his free will. To do so would be absurd. Free will is, of course, an oxymoron for the reason I have given -that no action is free of consequences- but we use it as a platitude anyway. Heaven and Hell offer so much a coersion and incentive that were they demonstrably real any semblance of free choice would evaporate, because no one in their right mind (and a right mind is designed by God to operate in such a way, thereby further denying freedom of will) would choose the option of Hell.

Again, I can think of no greater example than punishment dealt to children. If you tell them they will be grounded for doing a certain act, and they do it anyway, that is of their own volition knowing of the consequences should it be discovered that they completed said act. The punishment didn't deter the action, but the follow through is necessary to have complete and full udnerstanding of the action. And the action was completed with full knowledge of the consequences.

But full knowledge of the consequences does not exist. God has made Heaven and Hell utterly impossible to verify, to see, to experience, I would go so far as to say that they are even impossible to fully conceptualise in ones mind. How can this be considered full knowledge of the consequences? Also the very analogy of punishment of children is flawed. A punishment given out to a child is supposed to stop them from re-offending. It should never be simple retribution, that is base sadism. Hell is eternal... what possible chance of rehabilitation, of learning from one's mistakes, is available at the end of eternity? None, because such an end is impossible in the first place.

Look around you. Who doesn't know of concepts of eternal punishment/salvation? And does that truly affect the voluntary nature of our action? This conversation is proof to the contrary.

I am utterly at a loss as to what you are trying to prove with this statement.

In any event, I think "hell" is looked at the wrong way. It isn't a threat to force us to go a certain way. It is just the punishment for mortal sin. It's hard to explain, but there is a difference between "You will be punished for doing A" and "I will punish you for doing A." The former relies on your action being the basis of the punishment, the latter is based upon my act as the delivery system of punishment. Such is the nature of the punishment of hell, being that it through our free will and volition and based upon our voluntary actions, rather than being some notion of being damned by God.

Whichever way you choose to look at it, it's still the most amoral and descpicable of concepts, either created by the most cruel and pernicious of "divinities" or dreampt up by the most insane, morally reprehensible sadist to ever live.

 

[Dragoon952]

Even with that, I utterly fail to see how any crime or "sin" commitable on Earth, no matter how horrible or despicable, warrants eternal suffering and torment.

Again, I don't think you are looking at it the right way.

Hell isn't a thing created in of itself. It is the consequence that exists because of our action.

In the simplest of terms, if you are given the choice of "Do A or do B," each path has a result. If they both lead to the same, A and B are meaningless because it doesn't matter what you do. If they both lead to C, there is no distinct consequence for either A or B. If you want a consequence to exist, it is necessary that not obtaining that consequence must also exist.

Also, there must be an ultimate end to all of our actions. All things we do are means to an end, but those ends are never ends in of themselves but means to other things. You build a bridge to get to the other side, you want to get to the otehr side to aid commerce, on and on and on. They all point to a finality which has to exist, and with that finality there must exist a final outcome. Otherwise existence would have no final meaning.

All of these things (to me) point to a single reality: that we live in a system in which all parts must exist for the system to exist in perfection and logic. Just like my quote before, where fire cannot exist without a thing to burn or currupt, the perfection of the system also requires the "evils" to exist, and a perfect outcome for eternity can't exist without the other end of the spectrum to provide perfection to the system.

No action is totally free of consequences. We don't live in a vacuum. However there comes a point when actions cannot be considered a proper, moral choice precicely because of the given (often engineered) consequences. We would not dare say that a man making decisions at gun-point is exercising his free will. To do so would be absurd. Free will is, of course, an oxymoron for the reason I have given -that no action is free of consequences- but we use it as a platitude anyway. Heaven and Hell offer so much a coersion and incentive that were they demonstrably real any semblance of free choice would evaporate, because no one in their right mind (and a right mind is designed by God to operate in such a way, thereby further denying freedom of will) would choose the option of Hell.

I didn't say actions were totally free of consequences and that's my point. Hell is the result, the consequence, of certain actions. It is just a finality consequence that exists for the perfection of the system, a consequence that exists because of our free will and choice (not because God directly made it).

Also, I already stated about how there is a difference between voluntary action and involuntary action.

How is free will an oxymoron because of the existence of consequences? That is the only way free will can exist. It is the exact opposite of your statement. Your will and choices would NOT be free and would always be set if there was only one possible outcome. It would render everything involuntary.

We can't choose conseqeunces. We choose actions. And again, hell is a consequence, not a choice in of itself or an action. The choice we make is not to go to hell, but to commit mortal sin. Hell is the consequence of the choice to commit mortal sin. I may want to think that I will survive a fall from the top of the empire state building, but whether I think that or not won't chance the actual consequence. And the consequence will happen if I choose the action, in this case to jump.

But full knowledge of the consequences does not exist. God has made Heaven and Hell utterly impossible to verify, to see, to experience, I would go so far as to say that they are even impossible to fully conceptualise in ones mind. How can this be considered full knowledge of the consequences? Also the very analogy of punishment of children is flawed. A punishment given out to a child is supposed to stop them from re-offending. It should never be simple retribution, that is base sadism. Hell is eternal... what possible chance of rehabilitation, of learning from one's mistakes, is available at the end of eternity? None, because such an end is impossible in the first place.

It does exist and it's there for you to choose to believe it exists or not. We may not be able to conceptualize it fully, but we aren't left without any detail whatsoever. My understanding of Heaven, while admittedly incomplete, is the result of logic and reason based upon the system around us. It is the final step of a staircase that requires the understanding and agreement of the stairs that lead up to it.

Again, if finality exists, than a final outcome must exist. An enternal opportunity at rehabilitation will lead to a meaninglessness of consequences and meaningless of finality.

You are missing the point of disciplining the child. It's not a simple cause effect analysis, like a rat getting shocked when pressing a certain plate. Part of the point of discipline is to teach and show that the action is an offense in the first place, and you missed my point in bringing it up. The point was that we have volition and choice even though we reasonably know what the consequences are. The child that disobeys knows that he will be punished if he was caught, but does it anyway. Even though the punishment exists, we can still choose to perform an action. It could be that we don't care about hte punishment. It could be that we think we'l lget away with it. But in any case, knowledge of the punishment doesn't negat our ability to choose.

I am utterly at a loss as to what you are trying to prove with this statement.

If base knowledge of eternal damnation was such a big motivator as you claim, then there wouldn't be anyone who chooses to believe it. If it was the most terrible of coercions, who wouldn't pay it some heed?

Whichever way you choose to look at it, it's still the most amoral and descpicable of concepts, either created by the most cruel and pernicious of "divinities" or dreampt up by the most insane, morally reprehensible sadist to ever live.

It is the most despicable of concepts, but you are still attributing it to God as being the creator of it. Like he sat at his work bench and dreamed up the most horrible thing possible.

It is the punishment that exists for mortal sin, of which we choose to act. We need to be able to choose to act to truly have freedom of will. We need freedom of will to fully understand the universe and concepts around us. We need to fully udnerstand the universe and concepts around us to truly and actively participate in it. We need to be able to fully and actively participate in it to fully be able to particpate in and appreciate the good. And, thusly, we can't fully participate in and appreciate the good without all of the previous things in the system existing.